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Abstract
We discuss scientific realism from the perspective of modern cosmology,
especially primordial cosmology: i.e. the cosmological investigation of the very
early universe.
We first (Section 2) state our allegiance to scientific realism, and discuss
what insights about it cosmology might yield, as against “just” supplying sci-
entific claims that philosophers can then evaluate. In particular, we discuss:
the idea of laws of cosmology, and limitations on ascertaining the global struc-
ture of spacetime. Then we review some of what is now known about the early
universe (Section 3): meaning, roughly, from a thousandth of a second after
the Big Bang onwards(!).
The rest of the paper takes up two issues about primordial cosmology, i.e.
the very early universe, where “very early” means, roughly, much earlier (loga-
rithmically) than one second after the Big Bang: say, less than 10−11 seconds.
Both issues illustrate that familiar philosophical threat to scientific realism, the
under-determination of theory by data—on a cosmic scale.
The first issue (Section 4) concerns the difficulty of observationally probing
the very early universe. More specifically, the difficulty is to ascertain details
of the putative inflationary epoch. The second issue (Section 5) concerns dif-
ficulties about confirming a cosmological theory that postulates a multiverse,
i.e. a set of domains (universes) each of whose inhabitants (if any) cannot di-
rectly observe, or otherwise causally interact with, other domains. This again
concerns inflation, since many inflationary models postulate a multiverse.
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For all these issues, it will be clear that much remains unsettled, as regards
both physics and philosophy. But we will maintain that these remaining con-
troversies do not threaten scientific realism.
Keywords: scientific realism, primordial cosmology, inflation, multiverse
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1 Introduction
We will discuss scientific realism from the perspective of cosmology, especially pri-
mordial cosmology: i.e. the cosmological investigation of the very early universe.
We first (Section 2) state our allegiance to scientific realism, and discuss what
insights about it cosmology might yield, as against “just” supplying scientific claims
that philosophers can then evaluate. In particular, we set aside (Section 2.2) the
traditional methodological worry that cosmology cannot be a science; (because, it is
alleged, there being only one universe means that any putative laws of cosmology
would have only one instance). We also discuss limitations on ascertaining the global
structure of any universe described by general relativity (Section 2.3). Then in Section
3, we review in a realist spirit, some of what is now known about the early universe.
Here, “early” will mean, for us, times later than about 10−11 seconds after the Big
Bang (!).
The rest of the paper addresses, in more detail, two issues in cosmology that bear
on scientific realism: especially the theme, familiar in philosophy of science, of the
under-determination of theory by data. But the issues do not (we believe!) threaten
scientific realism. Rather, they clarify—and agreed: limit—what a scientific realist
should take as definitively established by modern cosmology. They both concern pri-
mordial cosmology; where “primordial”, and similarly “very early”, means for us: “so
early that the energies are higher than those which our established theories success-
fully describe”. This will turn out to mean: times earlier than about 10−11 seconds
after the Big Bang. The two issues each have a vast literature, written by cosmol-
ogists: who have proven—we are happy to report—to be very insightful about the
conceptual, indeed philosophical, issues involved.
The first issue (Section 4) concerns the difficulty of observationally probing the
very early universe. Thus expressed, this is hardly news: we would expect it to
be difficult! But the issue is more specific. In the last thirty years, it has become
widely accepted that at times much earlier (logarithmically) than one second after
the Big Bang, there was an epoch of accelerating expansion (dubbed inflation) in
which the universe grew by many orders of magnitude. The conjectured mechanism
for this expansion was a physical field, the inflaton field, φ, subject to an appropriate
potential V (φ); (or maybe by a set of such fields, but most models use a single field).
The evidence for this inflationary framework lies principally in (i) its solving three
problems that beset previous general relativistic cosmological models (the flatness,
horizon and monopole problems), and (ii) its explanation of some main features of
the cosmic microwave background radiation (CMB). However, this evidence leaves
very undetermined the detailed physics of the inflationary epoch: in particular, it
allows many choices for the shape of the potential V (φ), and there are nowadays
many different models of inflation.
The second issue (Section 5) concerns the difficulty of confirming a cosmological
theory that postulates a multiverse, i.e. a set of domains (universes) each of whose
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inhabitants (if any) cannot directly observe, or otherwise causally interact with, other
domains. This issue arises because many models of inflation amount to such a theory.
That is: according to many such models, in an epoch even earlier than that addressed
in our first issue—and even harder to access—a vast number of different domains came
into being, of which just one gave rise to the universe we see around us, while the
others “branched off”, and are forever inaccessible to us. That is, of course, rough
speaking: more details in Section 5. For now, we emphasize that this picture is very
speculative: the physics describing this earlier epoch is not known. The energies and
temperatures involved are far above those that are so successfully described by the
standard model of elementary particle physics, and far above those probed by the
observations described in relation to our first issue (as in Section 4).
Nevertheless, cosmologists have addressed the methodological question how we can
possibly confirm a multiverse theory, often by using toy models of such a multiverse.
The difficulty is not just that it is hard to get evidence. We also need to allow for
the fact that what evidence we get may be greatly influenced, indeed distorted, by
our means of observation: that is, by our location in the multiverse. Thus one main,
and well-known, aspect concerns the legitimacy of anthropic explanations. That is,
in broad terms: we need to ask: How satisfactory is it to explain an observed fact by
appealing to its absence being incompatible with the existence of an observer?’
For all the issues we discuss, it will be clear that much remains unsettled, as
regards both physics and philosophy. But we will maintain that these remaining con-
troversies do not threaten scientific realism. We can already state the main reason
why not. In Section 2, we will take scientific realism to be a claim along the lines “we
can know, indeed do know, about the unobservable”. But that does not imply that—
and it is simply no part of scientific realism to claim that—“all the unobservable is
known”; or even, “all the unobservable is knowable”. For example, we will maintain
that the scientific realist can perfectly well accept—should accept!—that:
(i) the global structure of space-time may be unknowable (indeed: will provably
be unknowable, if general relativity is true);
(ii) dark matter and dark energy are known to exist, but that their nature is un-
known;
(iii) even assuming there is an inflaton field φ, the potential V (φ) governing it
may be unknowable; and
(iv) a theory that postulates a multiverse faces special difficulties about confirma-
tion.
All these four admissions, corresponding to Sections 2.3, 3, 4 and 5 respectively, are
just ‘epistemic modesty’. They are compatible with the characteristic ‘epistemic op-
timism’ of scientific realism—that much is already known, and yet more can be: an
upbeat note on which our final summary (Section 6) will end.
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Issues that we set aside:—
We should also register at the outset several other ways in which our discussion will
leave issues unsettled. Partly this is a matter of setting issues aside just because we
intend to write a review of mainstream ideas in a limited space—and with limited
expertise! And partly it is a matter of the issues being open.
First: there are broad issues directly about scientific realism. For example:
(A): Does the fact that in cosmology, and indeed astronomy, we cannot manipu-
late the objects and events in question as we do in other sciences, undercut claims
of scientific realism; (or of its variants like Hacking’s entity realism (Hacking 1983,
Miller 2016)?
(B): Does this fact undercut claims about causation, at least when understood in
terms of manipulations or interventions (Woodward 2003)?
(C): Does the difficulty of observationally probing the early universe undercut sci-
ence’s usual strategy of confirming new theoretical postulates by finding independent
lines of access to the postulated entities? (This of course relates directly to our chosen
focus on the under-determination of theory by data.)
Such issues, especially the last, have been discussed very judiciously, and with more
detail than here, by Smeenk (2013: Sections 6–8; 2014: Sections 6–8; 2016: Sections
3–4).
Second: there are no less than five specific issues on which this essay might have
focused (rather than the under-determination of theory by data)—all of which bear
on scientific realism. We list them in a roughly increasing order of specificity vis-a`-vis
primordial cosmology. Though we will touch on some of them later, we will mostly
set them aside; so here we also give some references.
(1): In recent decades, developments in high-energy physics, such as string theory
and the recognition that most theories are effective, i.e. limited in their range of
validity, has made problematic the confirmation of putatively fundamental theories:
and thereby also, the defence of scientific realism. Cf. Dawid (this volume, 2013).
(2): At sufficiently early times after the Big Bang, energies are so high that
atoms and even nuclei ‘melt’, so that the proverbial clock and rod with which we
measure time and space cannot possibly exist. So we need to scrutinize the limits of
application of our temporal and spatial concepts in such regimes. This scrutiny has
been undertaken by Rugh and Zinkernagel in several papers (2009, 2016).
(3): Modern cosmology, especially inflationary cosmology, makes much use of
probability measures over, for example, some set of possible initial states in a cosmo-
logical model. How to define these measures rigorously, and how to then justify the
choice of one measure rather than another, are often hard, and disputed, questions.
Cf. for example, Schiffrin and Wald (2012); and for philosophers’ views, Koperski
(2005), Norton (2010) and Curiel (2015).
(4): Inflationary cosmology proposes that quantum fluctuations in the inflaton
field became classical and generated slight variations in matter density at early times:
variations that led to slight anisotropies in the cosmic microwave background radia-
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tion (CMB), which were then magnified by matter clumping together under gravity,
leading to stars and galaxies. We give some details of this remarkable mechanism in
Section 4.2.2. But we should note at the outset that in the transition from quantum
fluctuations to classical fluctuations, one faces quantum theory’s notorious measure-
ment problem! After all, ‘quantum fluctuation’ really means ‘non-zero amplitude for
more than one alternative’ while ‘classical fluctuation’ means (less puzzlingly!) ‘jitter
in the actual possessed value of a given variable’. Of course, practitioners of inflation-
ary cosmology recognize this; and many appeal to decoherence as a solution. But we
believe, along with most aficionados of the measurement problem, that decoherence,
though important, is not a complete solution. So the issue remains open; and fortu-
nately, some foundationally-inclined cosmologists pursue it. Cf. for example, Perez
et al. (2006), Sudarsky (2011), Can˜ate et al. (2013), Colin and Valentini (2016).
(5): The hypothesis of a cosmological multiverse raises several issues of scien-
tific method additional to those we will address in Section 5. One is whether the
difficulty of confirming the hypothesis, and-or the ensuing need to accept anthropic
explanations, prompt a revision in our conception of scientific explanation, or more
generally in our conception of science and its method. This has been the subject of
considerable debate: not surprisingly, since it borders on general questions about the
aim and scope of science, and the perhaps special role of cosmology in humankind’s
search to understand the universe and our place in it. Surveys of these issues can be
found in, for example, Carr (2014, especially Sections 4–6) and Ellis (2014, Sections
6, 8; 2016, especially Sections 2, 3, 6). Ellis and Silk (2014) is a good example of
skepticism about the multiverse.
So much by way of a list of issues to be set aside. (The list format is of course
not meant to deny that the issues are connected. They obviously are: for example,
conceptual advances about fundamental theories, under (1) or (4), might help with
(3)’s problems about measures.) We now turn to what we have promised we will
address . . .
2 Cosmology as a special case for scientific realism
We will first state our allegiance to scientific realism, and discuss what insights about
it cosmology might yield, as against “just” supplying scientific claims that philoso-
phers can then evaluate (Section 2.1). Then we set aside the traditional methodolog-
ical worry that cosmology cannot be a science, because, it is alleged, there cannot be
laws of cosmology (Section 2.2). Finally, we review some limitations on ascertaining
the structure of any universe described by general relativity (Section 2.3).
2.1 Scientific realism, and how cosmology bears on it
We take scientific realism to be the doctrine that most of the statements of the
mature scientific theories that we accept are true, or approximately true, whether the
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statement is about observable or unobservable states of affairs. Here, “true” is to be
understood in a straightforward correspondence sense, as given by classical referential
semantics. And, accordingly, scientific realism holds our acceptance of these theories
to involve believing (most of) these statements—i.e. believing them to be true in a
straightforward correspondence sense. This characterization goes back, of course, to
van Fraassen (1980: 7–9). It is not the only characterization: judicious discussions
of alternatives include Stanford (2006: 3–25, 141f.) and Chakravartty (2011: Section
1). But it is a widely adopted characterization—and will do for our purposes.
We are scientific realists in this sense. We concede that to defend this position in
general requires precision about the vague words “mature”, “accept”, “observable”,
“true” and (perhaps especially) “approximately true”. But we will leave this general
defense to more competent philosophers (the other Chapters in this volume, and e.g.
Psillos (1999, 2009)). Our theme is, rather, the relations between scientific realism
and cosmology; and our main claims about them, in particular that cosmology gives
no trouble to scientific realism, will not need such precision.
At first sight, this theme can seem unpromising, or at least limited. For scientific
realism is a general philosophical doctrine; so one naturally expects to assess it by
distinctively philosophical arguments. And at first sight, this suggests that cosmology,
or indeed any science, cannot be expected to help in the assessment: a science’s
results, theoretical and observational, can hardly be expected to determine what our
attitude to these very results (or other scientific results) should be. So it can seem
that our theme is merely a matter of cosmology providing examples of scientific claims
and theories that illustrate the philosophical theses of scientific realists—or perhaps,
of their various opponents: in short, a matter of cosmology providing case-studies for
philosophy of science.
We think there are two main replies to this skepticism. In short, they are as
follows. (1): Cosmology providing case-studies can be a rich theme, not a limited
one. (2): The distinction between the philosophical and the empirical is not as sharp
and straightforward as this skepticism assumes; and in fact cosmology raises various
issues that bear on scientific realism—not by cosmology’s results straightforwardly
illustrating it (or threatening it), but by cosmology prompting a general philosophical
question (or a whole line of thought) about it. We shall first say a little about (1);
and then turn to (2)—to which most of the paper is devoted.
(1): Obviously, a case-study can be rich in its philosophical morals. But modern
cosmology, with its truly stupendous knowledge claims, prompts a more specific point.
Cosmologists nowadays claim to have established, for example, that a second after
the Big Bang, the entire material contents of the universe we now see were confined
in a dense fireball, with a temperature of about 1010 K and a density of about 2000
kilograms per cubic centimeter. Hearing this, surely every philosopher (whether a
scientific realist or not!) feels a school-child’s thrill—quickly followed by worrying
how we could ever know such a proposition?
Our own view is that the cosmologists are right. That is: this particular claim,
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and countless other claims about the overall history of the universe from about the
one-second epoch onwards, are now, and will forever remain, as well established as
countless other scientific facts, e.g. that plants photosynthesize and that insulin has
fifty-one amino acids.
In Section 3, we will briefly defend this scientific realist view of the results of
modern cosmology. But we admit that the general task of assessing how scientific
realism fares in today’s cosmological theories would be very ambitious: by no means,
an unpromising or limited endeavor. Indeed, it would be too ambitious for us: we will
duck out of a general defence of our form of scientific realism for today’s cosmological
theories. For it would involve two major projects. One would have to first define what
parts of these theories are indeed “mature and accepted”. Then one would have to
argue that most of these parts are “true, or approximately true” in a correspondence
sense, whether they are about observable or unobservable states of affairs. These
projects outstrip both our knowledge of cosmology, and (a rather different matter)
our knowledge of what is the state of play in cosmology: i.e. what the community of
cosmologists regards as accepted.
To illustrate the substantial questions that arise here, we mention the obvious
topics: dark matter, and dark energy. (Ruiz-Lapuente (2010) is a fine collection, in-
cluding both observational and theoretical perspectives; Massimi and Peacock (2015)
is an introduction for philosophers.) We would say—along with most cosmologists,
of course—that:
(i) both of these are known to exist, and indeed known to dominate the matter-
energy content of the universe; but
(ii) they are not observable (at least: not yet!), and their nature is wholly un-
known.
Both (i) and (ii) obviously raise questions of both physics and philosophy. Thus:
in what sense are dark matter and dark energy known to exist, yet unobservable
(at least: not yet “directly observable”)? And does our present evidence for them
warrant taking our present statements about them to be true, in a correspondence
sense—even while we admit, a` la (ii), that their nature is wholly unknown?
(2): But even without undertaking (1)’s ambitious task of assessing how scientific
realism fares in today’s cosmological theories, there is much to discuss under the theme
of “scientific realism and cosmology”. For the distinction between the philosophical
and the empirical is not crisp or straightforward—as is obvious from all modern
philosophy of science. (Here it is usual to cite Quine (1953). But we maintain that
Quine was unfair to Carnap, and that there are much more nuanced treatments of
the relation between the philosophical and the empirical, and between the analytic
and the synthetic; cf. Putnam (1962), Stein (1992, 1994).)
And indeed, there are various issues in cosmology, that—rather than straightfor-
wardly supporting or threatening scientific realism—instead prompt a question (or a
whole theme) about it. We will first (Section 2.2) set aside one such theme, about the
role of laws in cosmology, since we think that nowadays it is a non-issue—as do most
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cosmologists, and philosophers of cosmology. Then we will review some theorems in
general relativity suggesting we cannot know the global structure of spacetime (Sec-
tion 2.3). As we will see, this gives a different perspective on the familiar philosophical
theme of under-determination of theory by data, viz. by emphasizing the need, not
just to obtain data, but to gather it together. Then in Section 3f., we will see how cos-
mology threatens the usual philosophical distinction between (i) under-determination
by all data one could in principle obtain, and (ii) under-determination by all data
obtainable in practice, or up to a certain stage of enquiry. (Following Sklar (1975:
380f.), (ii) is often called ‘transient under-determination’.) For data about the early
universe is so hard to get that what is not obtainable in practice looks very much
unobtainable in principle!
2.2 No laws of cosmology? No worries
There is an obvious “one-liner” objection one might raise about the idea that cos-
mology is a science: as follows. Since there is, by definition, only one universe, any
putative laws of cosmology could have only one instance.1 But laws are usually taken
to be, or at least to imply, suitable true generalizations: where what counts as ‘suit-
able’ is disputed, but is usually taken to imply having many more instances than just
one!2 So if a science aims to formulate laws, it seems that cosmology cannot be a
science.
The answer to this objection is clear. It is that cosmology can perfectly well be
a science, without formulating, or aiming to formulate, even one law whose instances
are universes. We say this, not because (as some philosophers maintain, e.g. Giere
(1999)) science in general does not need to formulate laws, and need only formulate
models: but because the laws of cosmology can just be the laws of the various physical
theories that describe parts of the universe. Thus there is an ambiguity in a phrase like
“a law governing a universe”, and similarly, in claims like “cosmology formulates laws
governing universes”. This can mean: either “a law whose instances are universes”,
in which case we reject the claim; or “a law whose instances are (as in other sciences)
parts of the universe (i.e. objects, events, states of affairs), but which is called “a
law governing a universe” because it is important in describing and-or explaining
the spatially and temporally very large-scale features of the universe, which are the
business of cosmology”—in which case we accept the claim. In short: the fact that
cosmology has the whole universe as its subject-matter—since it aims to describe and
explain the very large-scale features of the whole universe—is perfectly compatible
1Here and in the rest of this Subsection, “universe” can be taken as broadly as possible, so that
the discussion also covers a cosmology that posits a multiverse: i.e. for such a cosmology, please
read “universe” as “multiverse”.
2As recounted in countless discussions of laws of nature: the dispute mostly concerns distin-
guishing laws from “accidents”, i.e. merely accidentally true generalizations; and one tempting
way to make the distinction is to say that in a law, the universal quantifier “all” is unrestricted in
scope—which is meant to make for having many instances.
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with its laws being the laws of the various local physical theories: such as, in present-
day cosmology, the laws of the various quantum field theories, the various theories of
statistical mechanics and hydrodynamics, and special and general relativity.
There is a good analogy here between cosmology and geology. Both have a special
subject-matter—the universe and the Earth, respectively—about which they aim to
describe and explain, not every feature, but certain large-scale features. To do this,
they only need laws governing the parts of their subject-matter relevant to their de-
scriptive and explanatory aims: they do not need laws whose instances are universes,
or Earths. Thus cosmology is no more impugned as a science by the existence of only
one universe, than geology is by the existence of only one planet Earth (Cleland 2002,
Butterfield 2012: 4–7). (Agreed: with the discovery of exoplanets, ‘geology’ might
come to mean the science of all planets, or of all Earth-like planets. But the analogy
remains good, with the current meaning of ‘geology’.)
We said that this answer to the objection is clear. But we should note that
some sixty years ago, the objection was actively discussed. This was because it was
entangled with another more specific debate, about whether laws could describe a
putative origin of the universe (cosmogony); and this debate was vivid, and involved
cosmologists, because it related to the rival claims of the Big Bang and steady-state
theories—the latter of course denying that there was such an origin. Thus if you held
both that laws could not describe an origin of the universe, and that science aimed
to formulate laws, then you would be minded to favor the steady-state theory, since
it side-stepped this apparent limitation on science.
Besides, this debate involved other questions, which again relate to the nature and
role of laws in cosmology. One question, more philosophical than physical, concerned
cosmogony in general: is the idea of an origin of the universe, i.e. a beginning of
time, coherent? This had of course long been struggled with by philosophers, includ-
ing Aristotle and Kant. A second question was closer to physics: how if at all could
we justify the powerful, simplifying symmetry principles that were imposed on our
cosmological models? This second question was closely related to the Big Bang vs.
steady-state debate, since it took two more specific forms, one for each side of the
debate. Namely:
(1): How could an advocate of the Big Bang justify the cosmological principle
(CP) of the Big Bang (Friedmann-Robertson-Walker: FRW) models? (The CP re-
quires that on sufficiently large length scales, the universe is spatially isotropic and
homogeneous.) And:
(2): How could a steady-state theorist justify strengthening the CP’s require-
ments, by imposing the perfect cosmological principle (PCP): which added to spatial
isotropy and homogeneity, the requirement of time-constancy—and so forbad an ori-
gin of the universe?
Obviously, if one is faced with trying to justify such symmetry principles, it is tempt-
ing to seek a general argument: for example, along the lines that: (i) the aims of
science, or the formulation of laws of nature, or some similar general goal, require
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or presuppose that “Nature is uniform”; and (ii) this last requires spatial and-or
temporal “uniformity”, in a precise sense such as spatial isotropy, and spatial and-or
temporal homogeneity.
So much by way of sketching the scientific, and philosophical, debates in cosmology
some sixty years ago. To close this discussion, it suffices to note that these debates
died away after the mid-1960s, owing to the refutation of the steady-state theory
by the discovery in 1964 of the cosmic background radiation (CMB), the “echo” of
the primordial fireball described by the Big Bang theory. Accordingly, the original
objection above, that cosmology cannot be a science, also died away. Indeed, the
fact that the CMB should still be detectable was deduced already in 1948 by Big
Bang theorists in their model of early-universe nuclear physics—but the prediction
was forgotten about. Besides, this now-famous episode is itself a striking case of this
Subsection’s main point: that cosmology can manage perfectly well as a science, while
invoking only the laws of local physical theories.3
2.3 Ascertaining the global structure of spacetime?
We turn to reviewing some theorems (by Manchak (2009, 2011), building on ideas
by Malament (1977) and Glymour (1977)) to the effect that, according to general
relativity, one cannot know the global structure of space-time, even if one knew, as
completely as one could, the local facts about the structure of spacetime (and also,
the local facts about the state of matter and radiation).
Our review is brief, for two reasons. (1): These theorems have already been
discussed from a philosophical viewpoint (e.g. Beisbart (2009: 181), Norton (2011:
Sections 5,6), Smeenk (2013: Section 5, 628–33) and Butterfield (2014: Section 2,
59–60). (2): These theorems—despite their foundational interest—have not influ-
enced the theoretical cosmology community. This is presumably because they are
proved by a stupendous “cut-and-paste” construction on a given spacetime model: a
3For a history of the 1950s debate about laws in cosmology, cf. Kragh (1996: Section 5.2, 219–
51), who refers to philosophers such as Dingle, Harre, Munitz and Whitrow, as well as physicists.
Massimi and Peacock (2015a) is a philosophical introduction. The prediction of the CMB was by
Alpher and Herman (1948). For the history, cf. Kragh (1996: 132–5), Longair (2006: 319–23) and
(more popular), Barrow (2011: 139–47), Singh (2004: 326–36, 428–37). Durrer (2015) is a technical
review of (i) the history of investigating the CMB and (ii) the significance of the results, over the
last fifty years. For a fine philosophical discussion of laws in cosmology, cf. Smeenk (2013: Section
4).
Note that nowadays ‘Big Bang’ is ambiguous between three ideas: (i) the Big Bang theory, a very
well confirmed theory of the evolution of the observable universe; (ii) the Big Bang fireball, i.e. the
early conditions according to the Big Bang theory; and (iii) the Big Bang singularity, a hypothetical
beginning of time which, as we will see in Section 5, is even more hypothetical in the context of
eternal inflation. (Thanks to Anthony Aguirre for this point.)
Although we have no truck, and a scientific realist need have no truck, with Section 2.2’s original
objection: its second, more scientific, question—how can we justify cosmological models symmetry
principles?—is undoubtedly important. For the CP, we will return to this briefly in Section 2.3.
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construction which looks unphysical.4
These theorems provide a different perspective on the familiar theme of the under-
determination of theory by data: the idea that all possible observations might fail to
decide which of a set of alternative theories is correct. For most philosophical discus-
sions take “all possible observations” to mean the observations made by all observers,
wherever situated in space and time, without regard to bringing the data together at
some single point (or small spacetime region). But, on the other hand, cosmologists
are continually confronted with the limits of our observational perspective on the uni-
verse: for example, that we can only now observe the past light-cone of Earth-now;
and that direct observations by light, and other electromagnetic radiation, can go
back only to the time (about 380,000 years after the Big Bang) when the universe
first became transparent to radiation, i.e. to the last scattering surface, from which
the CMB originates. (On the other hand, we should note, indeed celebrate, examples
where we break previous limits to our observational perspective: the obvious current
example being the recent detection of gravitational waves (Abbott et al. 2016).) Thus
cosmologists will tend to be amenable to a definition of “all possible observations”
which reflects such limitations—and these theorems work with just such a definition,
albeit an idealized one.
Thus Manchak envisages that an observer at a point p in a spacetime M might
ascertain, by suitable observations, the metric structure of the past light-cone I−(p)
of p: after all, information, such as measurement results, from within I−(p) can reach
p by a signal slower than light. But Manchak goes on to prove that such an observer
cannot know much about the global structure of her spacetime, since many different
spacetimes, with widely varying global properties, have a region isometric to I−(p)
(where “isometric” means “has the same metric structure as”).5
More precisely: let us take a spacetime to be a manifoldM equipped with a metric
g, written (M, g). Then Manchak defines a spacetime (M, g) to be observationally
indistinguishable from (M ′, g′) iff for all points p ∈ M , there is a point p′ ∈ M ′
such that I−(p) and I−(p′) are isometric. (The fact that this notion is asymmetric
will not matter.) Then he proves that almost every spacetime is observationally
indistinguishable from another, i.e. a non-isometric spacetime.
More precisely, the theorems incorporate (i) a mild limitation; and two significant
4But this lack of influence may well be unfortunate. As discussed in the references in (1), and in
Manchak (2011): our defining a model by a cut-and-paste construction is no evidence at all that its
features are not generic among general relativity’s models.
5It is usual to write M for the spacetime, to indicate that it has the structure of manifold; and
the minus-sign superscript in I−(p) indicates the past, rather than future, light-cone. One might
object that an observer could surely not ascertain so much as the metric structure of her entire
past light-cone. But in reply: (i) this idealization only makes the theorem stronger, along the lines
“even if you knew the metric structure of your entire past light-cone, you could not know the global
structure”; (ii) there are theorems that support this idealization, e.g. about how to deduce the
metric structure of the interior of the light-cone from information about its boundary (Ellis et al.
1985: Section 12).
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generalizations ((ii) and (iii)).
(i): The theorems set aside spacetimes (M, g) that are causally bizarre in the
sense that there is a point p ∈ M such that I−(p) = M . (This last condition implies
various causal pathologies, in particular that there are closed timelike curves.)
(ii): But the theorems accommodate any further conditions you might wish to put
on spacetimes, provided they are local, in the sense that any two spacetimes (M, g)
and (M ′, g′) that are locally isometric (i.e. any p ∈ M is in a neighborhood U ⊂ M
that is isometric to a neighborhood U ′ ⊂ M ′, and vice versa) either both satisfy the
condition, or both violate it. (This means the theorems can probably be adapted
to allow assumptions about the observer at p ascertaining facts about matter and
radiation in I−(p).)
(iii): The theorems also prevent an observer’s ascertaining some significant global
properties of her spacetime. Manchak lists four such properties (2011: 413–414).
(Three are “good causal behavior” properties: viz. that the spacetime be globally
hyperbolic, inextendible and hole-free. We will not need their definitions. But it is
worth noting the fourth property, spatial isotropy: there being, at every spacetime
point, no preferred spatial direction. For this is crucial to the cosmological princi-
ple mentioned in (1) at the end of Section 2.2.) Thus the theorems imply: given
a spacetime (M, g) with any or all of these properties, there is an observationally
indistinguishable spacetime with none of them.
Thus Manchak’s theorems (2009: Theorem, p. 55; 2011: Proposition 2) amount
to the following.
Let (M, g) be a spacetime that is not causally bizarre, that satisfies any
set Γ of local conditions, and that has any or all of the four listed global
properties. Then there is a non-isometric spacetime (M ′, g′) such that:
(a): (M ′, g′) satisfies Γ, but has none of the four listed global properties;
and
(b): (M, g) is observationally indistinguishable from (M ′, g′).
What should we make of this endemic under-determination of global spacetime struc-
ture, even by perfect knowledge of the metric structure of the observer’s past light-
cone?
Though we cannot discuss this at length, we stress that previous philosophical
commentators (cf. the references at the start of this Subsection) are skeptical of the
obvious realist strategy, viz. condemning some of the observationally indistinguish-
able alternatives as unphysical. In particular, there seems no good general reason to
break the under-determination by imposing the cosmological principle (CP: cf. (1) at
the end of Section 2.2). For many models that violate CP are physically reasonable
(Beisbart and Jung 2006: 245–250; Beisbart 2009: Section 5, 189f.; Butterfield 2014:
Section 3, 60–65). More generally, on the topic of justifying cosmological models’
symmetry principles, we recommend: (i) for a conceptual introduction, Ellis (1975);
(ii) for recent work on the prospects for showing the universe to be homogeneous,
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Clarkson and Maartens (2010) and Maartens (2011).
However, as we also said: these theorems seem to have had no impact on cosmolo-
gists. As we will discuss in Section 3, cosmologists take themselves to have established,
during the last fifty years, a detailed account of the evolution of the universe, from
less than a thousandth of a second after the Big Bang onwards. (Here, “the universe”
can be understood as the past light-cone of Earth-now; or better: as the future light-
cone of the past light-cone of Earth-now.) This is an account which endorses CP,
by using a FRW model for spacetime. While many details of this account remain to
be understood (for example: the nature of dark matter and dark energy), there is a
strong consensus about what has already been established: which we will describe in
more detail in the next Section. Thus for cosmologists today, the live issues about
under-determination relate—not to the global structure of the universe in the above
sense (in particular, not to the rationale for CP), but—to:
(i) ill-understood aspects of the account after the first thousandth of a second,
e.g. our present evidence not settling the nature of dark matter and dark energy; and
(ii) the history of the universe much (logarithmically!) before one second, espe-
cially the nature of the putative inflationary epoch, and the idea of a multiverse: i.e.
issues about primordial cosmology: to which we will turn in Sections 4 and 5.
As mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, these issues will threaten the usual dis-
tinction between under-determination by all data one could in principle obtain, vs.
by all data obtainable in practice.
3 A smidgeon of what we now know
The last fifty years have seen the triumphant rise of observational cosmology as a
precision science. Looking back, the discovery in 1964 of the cosmic background radi-
ation (CMB) was an iconic initial event. But at least as important was the subsequent
use of satellites to make precise observations about parts of the electromagnetic spec-
trum that we cannot observe on earth: i.e. neither optical nor radio wavelengths.
This of course includes the microwave wavelengths of the CMB itself: whose prop-
erties have been measured with ever-greater precision, probing ever more finely the
early universe, by a succession of satellites: COBE, WMAP and Planck. This has
also of course depended on inventing and developing sensitive yet robust instruments
that can be reliably operated remotely, i.e. by radio signals: an extraordinary collab-
orative achievement of diverse disciplines, ranging from quantum optics to software
engineering. And quite apart from the CMB, the last fifty years has witnessed various
large and detailed observational programs, both terrestrial and by satellite. The even-
tual upshot of these observations, building up from countless precise measurements
of many diverse quantities—relating not just to the cosmos as a whole but to the
structure of stars and of galaxies—has been to give us a detailed overall history, not
just of the evolution of the universe as a whole, but also of the formation of galaxies
and the life-cycles of stars. Undoubtedly, we live in a golden age of cosmology!
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This is not the place for a detailed review of these developments aimed at philoso-
phers, fascinating though they are: both as regards the scientific methods used and
the stupendous cosmic history thus inferred. We have already, in (1) of Section 2.1,
ducked out of the attempt to say exactly which results of modern cosmology—which
chapters of the overall story just mentioned—should count as “mature and accepted”
and so, for we scientific realists, as approximately true in a correspondence sense.6
But to set the scene for later Sections’ discussions, we need to cite a few ‘bare
bones’ of the overall thermal history of the universe (Section 3.1). This will lead in
to a brief defense of scientific realism in relation to cosmology (Section 3.2).
3.1 Four snapshots of the early universe . . .
We have already mentioned that the properties of the CMB confirmed the idea of
a primordial fireball described by the Big Bang theory. More precisely, the idea is
that all the matter in the entire universe we can observe today was once, about
13.8 billion years ago, confined to a much smaller volume, at energies, temperatures
and densities so high that atomic structure breaks down, and there is instead a
“soup” of subatomic particles. This idea has been worked out in detail and with
great quantitative precision, by combining various parts of established physics: the
physics of how subatomic particles interact (comprising both the standard model of
elementary particle physics, and nuclear physics); the general relativistic description
of spacetime; and (relativistic) thermodynamics and hydrodynamics.
Agreed: as one considers earlier times, the energies (and temperatures and den-
sities) get so high that discussion needs must go beyond established physics. But
amazingly, established physics suffices to describe the fireball right back to about
10−4 seconds after the Big Bang!7
6So we here must set aside several topics that, independent of the general effort to assess how
scientific realism fares in cosmology, would form excellent case-studies. For example: (i) the life-
cycles of stars, for which cf. e.g. Chandrasekhar (1939), Kaler (2006), Ryan and Norton (2010);
(ii) the sophisticated methods and instruments used e.g. to establish astronomical and cosmological
distances, for which cf. e.g. Pasaschoff (1994), Rowan-Robinson (2011: Chapter 3) and Longair
(2003: Chapter 18, 478–98; 2006, Chapters 7, 11, 13).
7We here take “about 10−4 seconds” as the “cut-off for credence”, not because of a specific
problem or controversy, but simply because reason and evidence do not dictate a unique cut-off:
recall the discussion in (1) of Section 2.1. Certainly, 10−4 seconds is endorsed by some authorities;
e.g. Rowan-Robinson (2011: 100), and forty years ago, Weinberg endorsed 10−2 seconds (1977: 5).
But as we discuss below: it is also reasonable to be less cautious, since it is common nowadays to
take the boundary between known and speculative physics to be at about 10−11 seconds (!) after
the Big Bang as the cut-off (e.g. Earman and Mosterin 1999: 2). Agreed: it is also reasonable to be
more cautious, even taking one second. Anyway, for the interests and purposes of philosophers, the
scientific story is equally amazing when one is more cautious: say, withholding credence for times
earlier than one second. And certainly it is not reckless for a scientific realist to endorse the story
from about this time: one renowned expert says he is 99% confident of the story from one second
onwards (Rees: 1997: 65, 17; 2003: 24, 31).
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We now spell this out a bit. Two preliminary points: in effect, the first is about
space, and the second about time.
(1): We referred to “the entire universe we can observe today”. Bearing in mind
that light has a finite speed, so that we see more distant objects as they were at
earlier times, the appropriate meaning of this phrase, and similar phrases like “the
observable universe” is: the past light-cone of Earth-now. So the idea of a primordial
fireball is that all the matter and radiation content of the past light-cone of Earth-now
was once confined to a much smaller volume.8
(2): It will be helpful (though difficult!) to think logarithmically, not arithmeti-
cally: to think, for example, that since the present time is about 1017 seconds after
the Big Bang, the time t = 10−17 seconds before the Big Bang is as much before t =
1 second, as we are after it. Though this sounds blatantly wrong, the rationale for
it is that, as every physicist knows, physics is a matter of scales, i.e. orders of mag-
nitude. That is: if you change the object, or topic, or regime, you wish to describe
by an order of magnitude, i.e. by a factor of about 10, you are liable to need a very
different description: and even more likely if you change by two orders of magnitude,
i.e. by a factor of about 100. This trend holds whether the quantity whose value you
change is time, or distance, or energy or temperature: (indeed in quantum theory
and relativity theory, these quantities are intimately related, so that changing one
involves changing others). In particular, this means that when cosmologists puzzle
over what was the state of (the matter and radiation now comprising) the observable
universe, at say t = 10−6 seconds, or how physical processes changed as a result of
the cooling between, say, t = 10−11 and t = 10−6 seconds, we should not accuse
them of straining at gnats, i.e. of myopically concentrating on very transient matters
which cannot matter very much. For, agreed: the universe was changing unbelievably
rapidly (arithmetically speaking!); but the relevant processes change—and so our de-
scription must change—in crucial ways, depending logarithmically on the earlier time
considered.
So here are some snapshots from the thermal history of the observable uni-
verse: four snapshots, in reverse chronological order, all corresponding to established
physics.9
8Notice that on this usage, “observable” in “the observable universe” does not connote being
macroscopic: the observable universe includes all physical objects and events in the past light-cone
of Earth-now, no matter how microscopic. This usage was of course also in play in Section 2.3’s
idealization that an observer at p could “observe” metric structure on arbitrarily fine length-scales,
albeit only within her past light-cone.
9Agreed, only the first two concern times later than t = 10−4 seconds: which in footnote 7, we
took as the cut-off for credence. But recall that this choice was in the middle of the reasonable
spectrum, from 10−11 seconds to one second: cf. also the ensuing discussion in the main text.
Another indicator of how well-established is this thermal history is the fact that authoritative
textbook descriptions of it, written over the last forty years, largely agree with each other. Cf. for
example: Sciama (1971: Chapters 8, 12–14), Weinberg (1972: Chapter 15.6, pp. 528–545), Wald
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(A). t = 1013 seconds: which is about 380,000 years after Big Bang. This
is an important time: for at about this time, the universe first became
transparent to radiation (by free electrons combining with nuclei to form
atoms). So our direct observations by light, and other electromagnetic ra-
diation, can go back only to this decoupling time tdec. (It is also known as
the time of recombination: though all agree that combination would be a
much better name, since the electrons and nuclei were not stably combined
at any earlier time.) The temperature is about 3000 K (corresponding to
an energy of ∼ 0.3 eV). (By way of comparison, the temperature at the
surface of the Sun is about 6000 K). The size of the universe relative to its
size today (as given by the appropriate ratio of the scale factor) is ∼ 10−3,
and the mass density is ∼ 10−21 g/cm3.
(B). t = 10−2 seconds after the Big Bang. Temperature ∼ 1011 K (corre-
sponding to an energy of ∼ 10 MeV). Nuclei form: i.e. at higher temper-
atures, they “melt” into their constituent protons and neutrons. The size
of the universe relative to its size today is ∼ 10−11, and the mass density
is ∼ 109 g/cm3.
(C). t = 10−6 seconds after the Big Bang. Temperature ∼ 1013 K (corre-
sponding to an energy of ∼ 1 GeV). Protons and neutrons form: i.e. at
higher temperatures, they “melt” into their constituent quarks.The size
of the universe relative to its size today is ∼ 10−12, and the mass density
is ∼ 1017 g/cm3.
(D). t = 10−11 seconds after the Big Bang. Temperature ∼ 1015 K (cor-
responding to an energy of ∼ 100 GeV). This is the temperature/energy
above which the electromagnetic and weak forces are in a sense unified
in the electro-weak force (viz. by the effective potential being SU(2)-
symmetric), and below which they are distinguished by the Higgs mecha-
nism. That is: this is the temperature/energy at which the Higgs mech-
anism works, producing an electro-weak phase transition. Since the dis-
covery of the Higgs particle in 2012, this can be taken as the upper end
of the confirmed energy range for the standard model of particle physics.
That is: before t = 10−11 seconds, the energies are too high for us to
be confident that the standard model applies. The size of the universe
relative to its size today is ∼ 10−15, and the mass density is ∼ 1027 g/cm3.
We emphasize that this thermal history is by no means the only main claim of mod-
(1984: 107–117), Barrow and Tipler (1988: 367–408, Sections 6.1–6.7), Lawrie (1990: 315–326),
Longair (2006: 394–399), Weinberg (2008: 101–113, 149–173; Sections 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2). For fine
popular accounts, cf. Weinberg (1977, Chapters 5,7), Silk (1989: Chapters 6 to 8), Rowan-Robinson
(1999: Chapter 5), Silk (2006: 112–128).
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ern cosmology that is now firmly established. Other examples include our theories of
stars and galaxies: for which one could, as in footnote 9, cite authoritative descrip-
tions over several decades which largely agree with each other. But more relevant
to us is the way in which the CMB, though very homogeneous and isotropic, has
tiny irregularities whose structure (especially how their size depends on angle) gives
detailed evidence about the interplay before the decoupling time, between gravitation
tending to clump the matter, and radiation pressure opposing the clumping. This
interplay links directly to parameters describing the universe as a whole, such as
whether the average density is large enough for gravitational attraction to eventu-
ally overcome the expansion, so that the universe ends in a Big Crunch instead of
expanding forever. In the last fifteen years, data about these irregularities gathered
mostly by satellite projects like WMAP and Planck have been used to estimate these
cosmological parameters, resulting in a striking concordance with estimates obtained
by completely different methods. We will return to this topic in Section 4.
So much by way of citing some of modern cosmology’s stupendous claims about
the very early universe. Let us return to our warrant for believing them, and thus
our defense of scientific realism.
3.2 . . . as viewed by a scientific realist
Our main view is (as we said in (1) of Section 2.1) that indeed, cosmology has defini-
tively established such stupendous claims as those cited at the end of Section 3.1.
But we should add three clarifications to this realist credo. They expand on our
basic point in Section 1, that while scientific realism claims, roughly speaking, “we
can know, indeed do know, about the unobservable”, it does not claim that “all the
unobservable is known”; or even, “all the unobservable is knowable”.10
(1): A spectrum of reasonable credence:— Scientific realism enjoins us to believe
propositions about the unobservable only when the evidence is sufficiently plentiful
and varied. Of course, there can be no general statement of what would be “sufficient”.
And for cosmology, all parties admit that the evidence gets thinner as we consider
earlier and earlier times, corresponding to ever-higher energies, temperatures and
densities. As we mentioned in Section 3.1 (footnote 7 and snapshot (D)), it is common
nowadays to take the boundary between known and speculative physics to be at about
10−11 seconds after the Big Bang (this time corresponding to the electro-weak phase
transition). So for earlier times, observational data are so lacking and theory is
accordingly so speculative, that one has to be agnostic.
But of course, there is a spectrum here: of credence, as well as times and energies.
The standard model has indeed passed every test that experimental high energy
physicists have subjected it to, in the forty years since its formulation in the mid-
1970s; (culminating in the discovery of the Higgs boson in 2012). And the theories
10For a complementary discussion, cf. Butterfield (2012: Section 2.2).
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of nuclear physics, that describe the synthesis of nuclei from protons and neutrons
(a lower-energy process occurring at about 10−2 seconds after the Big Bang) are
even better confirmed than the standard model. But of course not every aspect
of the standard model (or even of nuclear physical theories) has been confirmed:
especially, its description of phenomena at the upper end of its (impressively wide)
energy range. So a scientific realist might be cautious, and not believe the standard
model’s description of the very early universe, for times earlier than some cut-off
time that is later than 10−11 seconds. For example, they might have a cut-off time
as late as 10−2 seconds, or one second: thus being more cautious than we reported in
footnote 7.
On the other hand, a less cautious attitude is also reasonable. Aspects of the
standard model involved in ‘snapshots’ (C) and (D) above, i.e. for t = 10−6 and
t = 10−11 seconds, have been confirmed in recent terrestrial experiments.
(i): Corresponding to snapshot (C): in the RHIC (Relativistic Heavy Ion Col-
lider) at Brookhaven, USA, protons in gold nuclei have been “melted” to produce a
(very short-lived!) quark-gluon plasma; (for an experimental review, cf. e.g. Shuryak
2005). This means the quarks were liberated from their confinement inside a proton,
after some 13× 109 years: indeed, a long prison sentence!
(ii): Corresponding to snapshot (D): at the LHC (Large Hadron Collider) at
CERN in 2012, the discovery of the Higgs particle lent credence to the mechanism,
proposed in the standard model, whereby interactions with the Higgs field gives ele-
mentary particles their mass. Thus it would also be reasonable to take the standard
model, even at the energies obtaining at t = 10−11 seconds, to be confirmed by ter-
restrial experiments: and to be a “mature and accepted” theory that earns our belief.
So a scientific realist could take t = 10−11 seconds as the cut-off for credence.
To sum up: in the last forty years, we have been very fortunate, as regards both:
(a) confirming the standard model in particle accelerators; and (b) successfully apply-
ing it to the early universe—whose enormous density makes it a very different regime
from the near-perfect vacuum of an accelerator.11
(2): Towards terra incognita:— But it is also reasonable to fear that this good
fortune cannot continue! More precisely: we should expect that, however fortunate
we may be in the future, as regards both (a) making observations and (b) developing
theories, we shall never know all, or even much, about arbitrarily high energies and
thus about arbitrarily early times. There are really three points in play here: two
about high-energy physics, and one about cosmology.
(i): As regards making observations, we cannot expect to—we cannot afford to!—
build particle accelerators that achieve arbitrarily high energies: or even energies
much above those now attainable. (But we should also note, in a more optimistic
tone, the power of human ingenuity and tenacity to make quantitative observations
11Our success in (b) depends on a striking feature of the theory of quarks and gluons, viz. asymp-
totic freedom: roughly, the strength of their interactions decreases at high density.
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of the most arcane kind. The obvious current example is again the recent detection,
culminating forty years of effort, of gravitational waves (Abbott et al. 2016): that
is, the detection of distortions of spacetime on a length-scale of a thousandth of the
diameter of a proton!)
(ii): As regards developing theories, we now realize (largely as a result of our
modern understanding of renormalization, led by Wilson’s work from the mid-1960s)
that by and large, the most we can hope for is effective theories: i.e. theories that
accurately describe phenomena that occur in a certain energy range, but are inaccu-
rate for higher energies.
(iii): As regards cosmology, recall that “the Big Bang” is really a label for terra
incognita. Formally, it labels a singularity of our theoretical descriptions, both the
general relativistic description of spacetime (infinite curvature etc.) and the quantum
description of matter and radiation (infinite energy, density etc.). But these infinities
surely represent breakdowns of our theories, not physical realities. And as we con-
sider higher and higher scales, of curvature, or of energy or density etc., we have no
guarantee that we are capable of formulating an accurate theory for phenomena at
those scales—or even that our basic concepts such as spacetime, and physical quan-
tities like energy and momentum, apply at those scales. And bearing in mind that
we need to think logarithmically: it is no solace to be told that this cognitive lacuna
is over in a minuscule fraction of a second!12
(3): Conceptual change:— Our realist credo is not intended to deny major epis-
temic ruptures, such as are often dubbed ‘conceptual change’ and-or ‘meaning vari-
ance’. Progress in cosmology has of course involved such ruptures, in the process of
establishing the present consensus about the universe’s history after about a thou-
sandth of a second: the outstanding example from twentieth-century cosmology is, no
doubt, general relativity’s description of spacetime as dynamical, and of the universe
beginning in a singularity. And future research about that history will presumably
again involve such ruptures. Looking ahead, the obvious putative examples are dark
matter and dark energy. They are a major causal and structural aspect of the cos-
mic history revealed by modern cosmology: indeed, they dominate the mass-energy
12For some more details, for philosophers, about point (ii), cf. e.g. Butterfield (2014a), Butterfield
and Bouatta (2015). Point (iii) broaches the vast topic of our search for a quantum theory of gravity:
for introductions aimed at philosophers, cf. e.g. Butterfield and Isham (2001), Rovelli (2007), Rickles
(2008), and Dawid, this volume.
Point (iii) also broaches two more specific topics: (a) the need to scrutinize whether our concepts
of space and time apply; cf. issue (2) in the list at the end of Section 1, and the work of Rugh
and Zinkernagel: (b) the need to scrutinize the definition of, and the occurrence of!, singularities in
general relativity. For (b) we recommend Curiel (1999). We also thank him for emphasizing that
one should not blithely claim that quantum effects will efface singularities, or that singularities will
not appear in an ultimate theory of quantum gravity. For notice that Wall (2013) shows that if the
Generalized Second Law is valid, then there will necessarily be singularities even in regimes where
quantum effects make themselves felt.
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content of the universe. But their nature is not understood: and gaining that under-
standing may involve some kind of epistemic rupture. So agreed: we still have a lot
to learn.
But a great deal is now established. In particular: we can be confident (albeit
not certain!) about the thermal history of universe, as sketched in the four snapshots
above. For we have very good physical reasons to believe that this history is robust
(especially at times from about a thousandth of a second onwards) to whatever the
dark matter and dark energy turn out to be.
4 The very early universe: inflation?
In the remainder of this paper, we turn to questions about the very early universe:
roughly speaking, about times earlier than t = 10−11 seconds, which as we saw in
Section 3 represents the “boundary” of our confirmation of the standard model of
particle physics. We will confine ourselves to the most widely accepted framework
for understanding this regime: inflation.13 Thus Section 4.1 begins by introducing
inflation, and so functions as a prospectus for both this Section and Section 5. Section
4.2 discusses the conjectured mechanisms for it, and Section 4.3 presents this Section’s
main point about scientific realism: that the details of the mechanism are seriously
under-determined by the data.
4.1 The idea of an inflationary epoch
As mentioned in Section 1: from about 1980 onwards, cosmologists have proposed
that there was a very early (and so brief!) epoch of very rapid, indeed accelerating,
expansion. They have made three main claims about this epoch: claims which will
dominate this Section and the next, so that we give them mnemonic labels.
(Three): Such an epoch solves three problems faced by the existing Big Bang
model, which by 1980 was well-established (it had already been dubbed “standard”
by Weinberg (1972: 469) and Misner et al. (1973: 763)). These problems are the
“flatness”, “horizon” and “monopole” problems.
(Inflaton): If this epoch was appropriately caused—viz. by a conjectured infla-
ton field—it would lead to characteristic features of the CMB: namely, characteristic
probabilities for the amplitudes and frequencies of the slight wrinkles (unevennesses)
in the CMB’s temperature distribution.
13But we stress at the outset that inflation remains a speculation, and that there are various
respectable alternatives. For maestri being skeptical about inflation, we recommend: Ellis (1999, p.
706–707; 1999a, pp. A59, A64–65; 2007, Section 5, pp. 1232–1234), Earman (1995, pp. 149–159),
Earman and Mosterin (1999), Hollands and Wald (2002), Penrose (2004, pp. 735–757, Chapters
28.1–28.5), Steinhardt (2011), and Ijjas et al. (2013); though we of course also recommend replies,
such as Guth et al. (2014). For reviews of some alternatives, such as string gas cosmology, cf. e.g.
Brandenberger (2013), or, aimed at philosophers, Brandenberger (2014).
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(Branch): This mechanism for inflation would naturally involve a branching
structure in which, during the epoch, countless spacetime regions branch off and
themselves expand to yield other universes; so that the whole structure is a “mul-
tiverse”, whose component universes cannot now directly observe/interact-with each
other, since they are causally connected only through their common origin in the very
early universe.
The evidence for, and status of, these three claims varies. Most cosmologists re-
gard claim (Three) as established: i.e. there was an epoch of accelerating expansion
(however it may have been caused) and the occurrence of this epoch solves the flat-
ness, horizon and monopole problems. But cosmologists agree that the cause of this
epoch—its mechanism: the dynamical factors that started it, and then played out
so as to end it—is much more conjectural; and therefore, so also is the third claim,
(Branch).14 The original proposal was that the mechanism was a scalar field, φ, the
inflaton field, evolving subject to a certain potential V (φ); and that this mechanism
led to characteristic features of the CMB. It is testimony to the strength of this pro-
posal that it remains the most popular mechanism, and there remain versions of it
which are confirmed by the CMB data. But this mechanism, and so the claim (In-
flaton), is undoubtedly more speculative than the mere occurrence of the epoch of
expansion. So we must beware of the ambiguity of the word “inflation”: it can refer
either to the epoch of expansion (also called “inflationary epoch”), however it was
caused; or to the (more speculative) mechanism for its occurrence. Finally, the idea
that the mechanism for inflation spawns many universes, i.e. claim (Branch), is even
more speculative.
We will now concentrate on the least controversial claim, (Three): i.e. the claim
that there was an inflationary epoch (however it was caused) and that such an epoch
solves the three problems—flatness, horizon and monopole—faced by previous general
relativistic cosmological models. Then Sections 4.2 and 4.3 take up claim (Inflaton),
about what caused the inflationary epoch. And Section 5 will take up claim (Branch),
about the multiverse.
4.1.1 An inflationary epoch solves three problems
The way in which an inflationary epoch solves the three problems has already at-
tracted philosophical discussion (e.g. Earman (1995: Chapter 5, especially 142–159),
Earman and Mosterin (1999: Sections 4–7, 14–26), Smeenk (2013: Section 6, 633–
638), Butterfield (2014: Section 4.1–4.2, 65–67), McCoy (2015)). This is not least be-
cause two of the three problems are problems, not so much of the empirical adequacy
of general relativistic cosmology, as of explanation—a natural topic for philosophers.
Thus, cosmology’s established model in the mid-1970s has two features, each of
which looks like an implausible coincidence that cries out for explanation. In both
14Thus Weinberg says: “So far, the details of inflation are unknown, and the whole idea of inflation
remains a speculation, though one that is increasingly plausible” (2008: 202).
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respects, the model is empirically adequate: the feature in question does not contra-
dict observations. But the feature requires an aspect of the model that is otherwise
free, i.e. not constrained by theory, to be fine-tuned to an extreme degree, on pain
of empirical inadequacy. The simplest and clearest example is the flatness problem,
where the aspect concerned is a theoretically central parameter about the spacetime
geometry; and it has to be fine-tuned to many decimal places. So we shall give some
details about that; then we will mention how similar considerations apply to the
horizon and monopole problems.
According to the Big Bang models of the 1970s (based on the Friedmann-Robertson-
Walker (FRW) metric), there are three main possibilities for the fate of the universe.
Either:
(i): the universe’s matter and radiation is on average dense enough that grav-
itation will eventually overcome the expansion, so that the universe is fated to reach
a point of maximum size and then “turn around”, i.e. contract and end in a Big
Crunch (and of course: the greater the density, the sooner will the turn-around and
Crunch occur): (called a closed universe); or
(ii): the matter and radiation density is low enough that gravitation cannot
overcome the expansion, though it slows the rate of expansion down to some asymp-
totically non-zero value: (called a open universe); or
(iii): the matter and radiation density is (a) low enough that gravitation can-
not overcome the expansion, but (b) high enough that it slows the rate of expansion
down, asymptotically, to zero: (called a flat universe, since the spatial geometry of
the instantaneous spatial slices is asymptotically Euclidean).
Obviously, (iii) i.e. flatness is theoretically privileged. For this value of the density
represents the boundary between the regimes (i) and (ii). So the important dimen-
sionless number is the ratio—which is written as Ω—of the actual density to this
critical value. So Ω = 1 corresponds to flatness.
According to the FRW models, if Ω is ever 1, then it is always 1. And in fact, the
observed value of Ω is close to 1. The universe is now, and indeed at all times later
than about one second after the Big Bang, almost flat: its spatial geometry is almost
Euclidean. But in these models, any difference of Ω from 1 in the early universe is
very rapidly amplified. For example: if at one second after the Big Bang, Ω = 1.08,
then already at ten seconds Ω = 2; and thereafter Ω keeps increasing exponentially.
And on the other hand: if at one second after the Big Bang, Ω = 0.92, then already
at ten seconds Ω = 0.5; and thereafter Ω keeps decreasing exponentially. In short:
Ω = 1 represents an equilibrium—but a very unstable equilibrium. And this means
that for Ω to be about 1 today requires that it be stunningly close to this privileged
value soon after the Big Bang: for example, it has to be 1±10−16 at one second after
the Big Bang.15
15For these numbers, cf. Guth (1997: 25), or Liddle (2003: 100). Note that 10−16 is about the
ratio between the width of a human hair (viz. a tenth of a millimeter) and the average distance
between Earth and Mars (viz. 225 million kilometers)! And of course, for times earlier than one
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Should this degree of fine-tuning be treated as a “coincidence”: i.e. a brute
fact, set aside from the quest for explanation? Agreed: it is in general a matter of
judgment, not dictated by the scientific context, what facts it is legitimate to treat
as brute. But in this case: the fine-tuning is so extreme that it cannot be dismissed
as brute.
And the idea of an inflationary epoch promises to predict and-or explain Ω being
close to 1. For it is easy to show that whatever the value of Ω at the onset of the
inflationary epoch, Ω will be driven close to 1 by the end of the period, and will remain
close to 1 for a very long time thereafter—including until now. (So the explanation
is dynamical: in philosophers’ jargon, causal.) Besides, the idea of this explanation
is very simple: an expansion of a highly curved surface makes a local patch flatter.
Think of blowing up a balloon; or how the fact that the earth is large makes our local
patch of it seem flat (e.g. Guth 1997: 176–177; Liddle 2003: 99, 104; Serjeant 2010:
27–28, 56).
The horizon problem has a similar structure. Namely: our cosmological descrip-
tion (as of the late 1970s) is empirically adequate, but requires an aspect—in this
case, an initial condition—to be fine-tuned to an extreme degree: so extreme that
it is implausible to treat it as a brute fact. Recall that the CMB, dating from the
decoupling (recombination) time tdec (380,000 years, or about 10
13 seconds), is very
homogeneous and isotropic. Its wrinkles are minuscule: their proportional size is
10−5, which is like having, on the surface of a pool of water one meter deep, a wave
only a hundredth of a millimeter high! Yet for two directions in space with a sufficient
angular separation, the two past events at the time tdec that lie along those directions
, i.e. the two emission-events of the CMB, have—according to the 1970s’ models—no
common causal past. That is, their past light-cones do not intersect. In the notation
of Section 2.3, calling the events p, q ∈ M : I−(p) ∩ I−(q) = ∅. This means there
can be no process of thermalization or equilibration—or any kind of interaction—
establishing the strong correlation in the properties of the CMB coming from the
different directions. The strong correlation must just be accepted as a brute fact.
This is all the more embarrassing when one calculates that the angular separation
sufficient to imply no common causal past is tiny: about 2 degrees.16
Again, the idea of an inflationary epoch solves the problem: and in a simple way.
Namely: a suitable inflationary epoch implies that the past light-cones of all emission
events of the CMB—even for points on opposite sides of the sky—do in fact intersect;
and so there could have been a suitable process of equilibration. In this way, the
uniformity of the CMB, even on opposite sides of the sky, is explained: (e.g. Guth
1997: 182–186; Liddle 2003: 102, 109; Serjeant 2010: 53, 55).
second, the fine-tuning is to yet more decimal places.
16Embarrassment at having to accept strong correlation as a brute fact echoes the intuitive plau-
sibility of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause: which is much discussed as a motivation
for the locality assumptions in Bell’s theorem (cf. Ruetsche, this volume). For more about this
comparison, cf. e.g. Earman (1985: Chapter 5), Butterfield (2014: Section 4.2).
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Turning to the monopole problem: this is a problem of empirical adequacy, rather
than a problem of having to treat as brute what seems to need an explanation. It also
differs from the flatness and horizon problems in being a matter of detailed, albeit
speculative, physics, rather than spacetime geometry. Namely: there is good reason to
think that at sufficiently high energies (and so: sufficiently early times) the strong and
electro-weak forces are unified, in the same sort of way that classical electromagnetism
a` la Maxwell unifies electric and magnetic forces; (recall snapshot (D) in Section 3.1).
Theories of this unification, which began to be formulated in the 1970s, are called
“GUTs” (for “Grand Unified Theories”). The problem is that GUTs, applied to the
very early universe, predict the production of very many magnetic monopoles: these
are particles that have a magnetic charge, broadly analogous to the familiar electric
charge. But these particles have never been detected: a matter of contradiction with
observation (rather than embarrassment at treating a fact as brute).
As to how an inflationary epoch solves this problem: the idea of the solution is
attractively simple, as it was for the flatness and horizon problems. Namely: (i) one
accepts that the magnetic monopoles are produced, thus not questioning the admit-
tedly speculative physics; but (ii) the enormous expansion occurs after, or at worst
during, monopole-production, so that the expansion vastly dilutes the monopoles.
Thus in the tiny pre-inflation patch that expanded to become the observable uni-
verse, there would be so few magnetic monopoles that we would not expect to have
detected them.17
So much by way of presenting the three problems; and the simple underlying ideas
of the solutions given by an inflationary epoch. This discussion prompts the question:
how much inflation? That is: how much expansion of the universe, involving how
much acceleration—and when—makes the three solutions come out quantitatively
correct?
Of course, each problem prompts a separate calculation of how much expansion,
and when, would be sufficient for the solution. Needless to say, each calculation
involves auxiliary assumptions, which can be questioned. But the calculations are
also partly independent of each other: so the fact that the resulting estimates agree
pretty well is evidence in favor of an inflationary epoch. We of course cannot give
details of such calculations. We just report the consensus that all three solutions
come out quantitatively correct, if we postulate figures like the following (dizzying
though they be!):
(a): the inflationary epoch ends at about 10−34 seconds: which is a time
17Our description of the monopole problem is so brief that it may be misleading: but a detailed
description inevitably leads into the issue of what caused the inflationary epoch, i.e. claim (Inflaton)
which we have postponed to Section 4.2. For a superb popular account, by one of the inventors of
inflation, cf. Guth (1997: Chapter 9, 147–165). A detailed account of inflation’s solutions to all
three problems can be found in Kolb and Turner (1990: Section 8.1–8.2) and Linde (1990: Section
1.5–1.7).
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corresponding to GUT-scale energies, viz. E ≈ 1015 GeV (so that the temperature
T = E/kB ≈ 10
28 K);
(b): the inflationary expansion is exponential: and started at, for example,
5 × 10−35 seconds with a characteristic expansion time (i.e. the time in which the
scale factor—the radius of the universe—is multiplied by e ≈ 2.7) of about 10−36
seconds.
Taken together with (a), this would imply expansion by a factor e50 ≈ 1022! (For
further details, cf. e.g. Liddle 2003: 106–7; Serjeant 2010: 55.)
Let us sum up this Subsection’s discussion of claim (Three). It is generally agreed
that postulating an inflationary epoch, occurring in a suitable time-interval and in-
creasing the size of the universe by suitably many orders of magnitude, solves the
flatness, horizon and monopole problems. All three solutions invoke a satisfyingly
simple idea so as to explain the puzzling feature in question. Besides, these solutions
are resilient, in that they are independent of what might have caused the inflationary
epoch ... but of course, one still asks: what caused that epoch?
4.2 What caused the accelerating expansion?
In answering this question, the first thing to stress is that we are here in the realms
of speculation: recall Weinberg’s warning in footnote 14! We shall confine ourselves
to reporting a “minimal” answer: which postulates a scalar field, φ, the inflaton
field, evolving subject to a certain potential V (φ)—cf. claim (Inflaton) at the start
of Section 4.1. As we will see, a few assumptions about this mechanism yields some
characteristic predictions for subtle features of the CMB. And since these features
have been observed by a sequence of increasingly refined instruments (such as the
satellites COBE, WMAP and Planck mentioned at the start of Section 3), these
confirmed predictions are nowadays regarded as a more important confirmation of
inflation, than its solution of Section 4.1.1’s three problems. There is, however, a
very considerable under-determination of the mechanism of inflation by our data—
both today’s data, and perhaps, all the data we will ever have. This (unfortunate!)
predicament will be the topic of Section 4.3. (Then in Section 5 we will turn to the
most controversial claim (Branch), that inflation yields a multiverse of domains.)
4.2.1 The inflaton field
We begin with a simple classical picture of inflation, postponing quantum consider-
ations to Section 4.2.2. We begin by assuming that at approximately 10−35 seconds
after the Big Bang, the stress-energy of the universe was dominated by that asso-
ciated with some (yet to be discovered) scalar field φ(t, ~x), known as the inflaton;
and that the evolution of this scalar field is determined by a potential energy density
V (φ), and by its coupling to the gravitational field.
We also assume that the dynamics of the scalar field is very simple, as follows. The
scalar field is homogeneous: i.e., the same throughout space, so that the field is then
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only a function of time, φ(t, ~x) ≡ φ0(t).
18 And the potential has a single minimum
towards which the field ‘rolls’: much as a classical particle would roll towards the
minimum of a potential, subject to a force in the direction of the negative of the
potential’s gradient.
It turns out that accelerating expansion of the underlying spacetime can occur
when the potential energy density dominates over the kinetic energy of the inflaton
field: i.e. V (φ0)≫
1
2
φ˙2
0
(t): a regime called the slow-roll of the inflaton. In a bit more
detail: what one requires for accelerating expansion is a fluid with a pressure P that
is negative; more specifically, P < −1
3
ρ, where ρ is the energy density of the fluid.
For the scalar field above (which can be thought of as a fluid in this sense), where
V (φ0)≫
1
2
φ˙2
0
(t), the pressure P comfortably satisfies this constraint.
Inflation comes to an end when the inflaton finds its way to the minimum of the
potential; typically, the slope of the potential gets larger, and the kinetic energy of the
inflaton increases so that accelerating expansion can no longer occur. The inflaton
oscillates (with a decaying amplitude) around the minimum of the potential, and
the stored energy is released into particles of the standard model of particle physics
through a process known as reheating.
Although this is just one means through which the universe can expand by the
amounts needed to solve the three problems discussed in Section 4.1.1, taking this
slow-roll scenario seriously—that is, analyzing single-field slow-roll inflationary mod-
els, and deducing observational parameters—has hitherto been cosmologists’ predom-
inant way of exploring and assessing the idea of inflation.
4.2.2 Connecting the inflaton to the CMB
If this was all there was to the theory of inflation, it would probably not have the
following amongst cosmologists that it does today. Arguably the most impressive
success of the inflationary paradigm is its providing a mechanism for understanding
the origin of subtle features of the CMB. The setting for this success is a quantum
treatment of the (putatively classical) story sketched in Section 4.2.1; and it to this
connection between the inflaton and the CMB that we now turn.
The basic observable associated with the CMB is the intensity of radiation as a
function of frequency and direction in the sky (Hu and Dodelson 2002). To a very good
approximation, the CMB has a black-body spectrum with an average temperature
of T¯ ∼ 2.73 K (∼ −270.42 degrees C). But the temperature is not exactly uniform
across the sky; there are small fluctuations about this mean on the order of 10−5 in
size. That is: given the temperature T (θ, φ) for a given direction (θ, φ) in the sky, we
18Agreed, you might object that assuming homogeneity undercuts the claim to have solved the
horizon etc. problems. But in reply: there is active research to ascertain how much homogeneity is
needed to secure inflation (Brandenberger (2016), East et al. (2015), Kleban and Senatore (2016));
and anyway, we aim in this essay only to lay out the main ideas.
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subtract the mean temperature T¯ and define a dimensionless temperature anisotropy
∆T
T
(θ, φ) :=
T (θ, φ)− T¯
T¯
. (4.1)
It is this quantity that is about ±10−5 for any direction (θ, φ). By expressing it
with spherical harmonics (the analogue for the surface of a sphere, of elementary
Fourier series for functions on a real interval), we can represent how the size of these
irregularities in T vary with angular scale. Of course, we expect the exact variation
with direction in the sky, and with angular scale, to be a matter of happenstance:
so we must adopt a statistical approach. So we postulate an ensemble of possible
temperature functions T (θ, φ), equipped with a probability distribution. We then
use the distribution to calculate various means (averages) and dispersions (spreads),
which we compare with experiment.
The upshot of this is that for each positive integer l, a number Cl encodes the mean
size of irregularities on an angular scale of about 180 deg /l. Thus l = 1 corresponds
to being hot in one direction and cold in the opposite direction. Indeed, there is such
a contribution, thanks to the Doppler effect due to the Earth’s motion relative to
the CMB (with the hot direction corresponding to shorter wavelengths, i.e. motion
towards the CMB). The set of the Cl is called the angular power spectrum.
Of course, this statistical approach makes various assumptions, albeit defeasible
ones: such as that the temperature fluctuations are Gaussian, which means that
the angular power spectrum completely determines the statistics of the fluctuations.
There are also other subtleties about the power spectrum such as (i) acoustic os-
cillations which are also a function of angular scale, and (ii) anisotropies associated
with polarization effects in the CMB: but we will set these aside (for a discussion,
see Baumann and Peiris 2009). Thus the issue at hand is how these anisotropies in
temperature form, and what determines their statistics.
Inflationary cosmology proposes that these anisotropies come from small pertur-
bations in the inflaton field, arising from its quantum fluctuations: perturbations
which can then be connected (via the appropriate transfer function) to the angular
power spectrum of the CMB. It is a remarkable story, spanning a complex sequence
of cosmological events: but one worth briefly describing since it represents the pre-
dominant way of thinking about the origin of CMB anisotropies. (We set aside the
issue of the quantum-classical transition: cf. (4) at the end of Section 1.)
The proposed mechanism is that as the (homogeneous) inflaton φ0(t) rolls down
the inflaton potential, it acquires spatially dependent quantum fluctuations δφ(t, ~x).
These fluctuations mean that inflation will end at different points of space ~x at differ-
ent times; and this leads to fluctuations in energy density after the end of inflation,
ultimately giving rise to fluctuations in CMB temperature as a function of position
in the sky.
The fluctuations in the inflaton field are computed in quantum theory. One can
compute a power spectrum of scalar (inflaton) fluctuations, Ps(k) (here expressed as
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a function of the Fourier wavenumber k), whose scale (k) dependence is summarized
by the scalar spectral index ns. If ns = 1 then the power spectrum is scale-invariant,
whereas ns 6= 1 encodes deviations from scale invariance. These perturbations also
lead to the generation of primordial gravitational waves (i.e. tensor fluctuations), for
which an analogous power spectrum can be computed. It is designated by Pt(k), for
which a similar tensor spectral index nt can also be defined. The relative strength
of tensor to scalar perturbations is an important cosmological parameter, and is
measured by the tensor-to-scalar ratio: r := Pt(k⋆)/Ps(k⋆), measured at a particular
reference scale k⋆.
From these power spectra for scalar and tensor fluctuations, one can infer angular
power spectra for temperature and for polarization in the CMB; and conversely, mea-
sured power spectra in the CMB can be used to infer primordial power spectra. In
particular, the scalar spectral index ns and the tensor-to-scalar ratio r are commonly
used to constrain single-field slow-roll inflationary potentials. Recent Planck data
[Ade et al. (Planck Collaboration) 2015] finds that:
(i) ns = 0.968± 0.006 (i.e., primordial fluctuations are nearly scale invariant), at
a 68% confidence level; and
(ii) r < 0.11, at a 95% confidence level.
Thus inflation—even its simpler, single-field slow-roll, models—indeed provides
potentials that are consistent with the statistics of the CMB. But how many such
single-field slow-roll models are consistent with CMB measurements? It is to this
question, and the underlying under-determination that its answer reveals, that we
now turn.
4.3 A plethora of models
The fact that inflation provides a mechanism for understanding both (i) very large-
scale homogeneous features of our universe (Section 4.1) and (ii) much smaller-scale
inhomogeneities apparent in the CMB (Section 4.2), suggests that inflationary models
should be highly constrained. Indeed, they are. But there remains a wide variety of
possible inflationary models which yield these impressive successes. And this variety
is not a mere matter of (a) margins of error, or (b) simplicity: like a case where a
physical field, e.g. a potential function, can be ascertained either (a) only within
certain bounds, or (b) only by assuming it is simple in some precise sense (e.g. being
a polynomial of degree at most four). Instead, inflationary models that differ by
substantially more than matters (a) and (b) yield predictions that are the same—at
least, the same so far as we can confirm them.
Agreed: one might hope that this under-determination is not a problem with the
theory of inflation per se, but only a reflection of the effective nature of the theory.
That is: although primordial inflation operates at very high energies (∼ 1016 GeV),
it is expected to be some low-energy limit of a fundamental theory whose details are
yet to be worked out (Cheung et al., 2008): and which will, one hopes, overcome the
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under-determination. Be that as it may, we now give some details about the wide
variety of possible inflationary models.
Broadly speaking, inflationary model building is pursued along three main av-
enues: in terms of:
(i) a single scalar field (as outlined in Section 4.2.1); or
(ii) multiple scalar fields (known as“multi-field inflation”); or
(iii) non-scalar degrees of freedom.
As in Section 4.2, we shall focus on (i), and on models where the scalar field is
minimally coupled to gravity: which is presumably, the simplest means of realizing
inflation.
First, the good news. Such models predict negligible non-Gaussianities in the
CMB, and are thus promising candidates for providing a description of the state of
the very early universe. And some of them disagree with each other as regards some
observations we may indeed be able to make. For example: one can categorize such
models according to the range of field values ∆φ through which the inflaton rolls
(down the potential), between the the time when the largest scales now observed in
the CMB were created, and the end of inflation. When this range ∆φ is smaller
than the Planck scale, ∆φ < MPl, we say there is “small-field inflation” ; whereas
large-field inflation occurs when ∆φ > MPl. One observational difference between
these two categories is the size of the primordial gravitational waves they predict:
large-field inflation (but not small-field inflation) predicts gravitational waves that
we may indeed be able to see in the near future.
But there is also bad news: that is, a worrying plethora of models. In a bid
to understand the various possibilities for inflationary models, Martin, Ringeval and
Vennin (2014a) have catalogued and analyzed a total of 74(!) distinct inflaton po-
tentials that have been proposed in the literature: all of them corresponding to a
minimally coupled, slowly-rolling, single scalar field driving the inflationary expan-
sion. And a more detailed Bayesian study (Martin et al., 2014b), expressly comparing
such models with the Planck satellite’s 2013 data about the CMB, shows that of a
total of 193(!) possible models—where a “model” now includes not just an inflaton
potential but also a choice of a prior over parameters defining the potential—about
26% of the models (corresponding to 15 different underlying potentials) are favored
by the Planck data. A more restrictive analysis (appealing to complexity measures
in the comparison of different models) reduces the total number of favored models to
about 9% of the models, corresponding to 9 different underlying potentials (though
all of the “plateau” variety). To sum up: although this is an impressive reduction of
the total number of possibilities, there remains, nevertheless, an under-determination
of the potential by the data: an under-determination that is not a mere matter of
(a) margins of error, or (b) simplicity, of the kind noted at the start of this Section.
And of course, we have not surveyed the other avenues, (ii) and (iii) above, through
which inflation might be implemented: let alone the rival frameworks mentioned in
footnote 13.
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Agreed, and as we said at the start of this Section: one can hope that this under-
determination will be tamed as theories are developed that describe the universe
at energy levels higher than those at which inflation putatively operates. But—as
we shall discuss in Section 5—this regime of yet higher energies may yield another,
perhaps more serious, problem of under-determination: a problem relating to distance
scales that far outstrip those we have observed, and indeed, those that we will ever
observe.
5 Confirming a multiverse theory
5.1 Eternal inflation begets a multiverse
One of the more startling predictions of a variety of inflationary models is the existence
of domains outside our observable horizon, where the fundamental constants of nature,
and perhaps the effective laws of physics more generally, vary (Guth 1981; Guth
and Weinberg 1983; Steinhardt 1983; Vilenkin 1983; Linde 1983, 1986a, 1986b).
More specifically: such a ‘multiverse’ arises through eternal inflation, in which once
inflation begins, it never ends.19 Eternal inflation is predominantly studied in two
broad settings: (1) false-vacuum eternal inflation and (2) slow-roll eternal inflation.
(1): False-vacuum eternal inflation can occur when the inflaton field φ, which is
initially trapped in a local minimum of the inflaton potential V (φ) (a state that is
classically stable but quantum mechanically metastable—i.e., a ‘false’ vacuum), ei-
ther:
(a) tunnels out of the local minimum to a lower minimum of energy-density, in
particular to the ‘true vacuum’, i.e. the true ground state: (as described by Coleman
and De Luccia (1980)); or
(b) climbs, thanks to thermal fluctuations, over some barrier in V (φ), to the true
vacuum.
The result is generically a bubble (i.e. a domain) where the field value inside ap-
proaches the value of the field at the true vacuum of the potential. If (i) the rate of
tunneling is significantly less than the expansion-rate of the background spacetime,
and-or (ii) the temperature is low enough, then the “channels” (a) and-or (b) by
which the field might reach the true vacuum are frustrated. That is: inflation never
ends, and the background inflating space-time becomes populated with an unbounded
number of bubbles. (Cf. Guth and Weinberg (1983); and see Sekino et al. (2010) for
a recent discussion of the various topological phases of false-vacuum eternal inflation
that can arise in a simplified setting.)20
19This process should more accurately be described as future-eternal inflation. Borde, Guth, and
Vilenkin (2003) argue that inflation cannot be past-eternal; but see Aguirre (2007a) for a different
interpretation of their results.
20After about 2000, this type of eternal inflation gained renewed interest in light of the idea of a
string landscape, in which there exist multiple such metastable vacua (Bousso and Polchinski 2000;
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(2): In slow-roll eternal inflation, quantum fluctuations of the inflaton field over-
whelm the classical evolution of the inflaton in such a way as to prolong the infla-
tionary phase in some regions of space. When this is sufficiently probable, eternal
inflation can again ensue; (Vilenkin 1983, Linde 1986a, 1986b; see Guth (2007) for a
lucid summary, and Creminelli et al. (2008) for a recent discussion). It is striking that
the self-same mechanism that gives rises to subtle features of the CMB (as discussed
in Section 4.2.2), can, under appropriate circumstances, give rise to a multiverse.
Though it is not clear how generic the phenomenon of eternal inflation is (Aguirre
2007a; Smeenk 2014), it remains a prediction of a wide class of inflationary models.
So in this Section, we turn to difficulties about confirming cosmological theories that
postulate a multiverse. Thus we will assume that the multiverse consists of many
(possibly an infinite number of) domains, each of whose inhabitants (if any) cannot
directly observe, or otherwise causally interact with, other domains; (though we will
soon mention a possible exception to this).
There is a growing literature about these difficulties. It ranges from whether there
could, after all, be direct experimental evidence for the other universes, to method-
ological debates about how we can possibly confirm a multiverse theory without ever
having such direct evidence.
We focus here on the methodological debates.21 Thus for us, the main theme
will be—not that it is hard to get evidence—but that what evidence we get may be
greatly influenced by our location in the multiverse. In the jargon: we must beware
of selection effects. So one main, and well-known, theme is about the legitimacy of
so-called anthropic explanations. In broad terms, the question is: how satisfactory is
it to explain an observed fact by appealing to its absence being incompatible with
the existence of an observer?
We of course cannot take on the large literature about selection effects and an-
thropic explanations: (cf. e.g. Davies (1982); Barrow and Tipler (1988); Earman
(1987); Rees (1997); Bostrom (2002); McMullin (1993, 2005, 2007); Moster´ın (2005));
Carr (2007); Landsman (2016)). We will simply adopt a scheme for thinking about
these issues, which imposes a helpful ‘divide and rule’ strategy on the various (often
cross-cutting and confusing!) considerations (Section 5.2). This scheme is not orig-
inal to us: it combines proposals by others—mainly: Aguirre, Tegmark, Hartle and
Srednicki. Then in Section 5.3, we will report results obtained by one of us (Azhar
(2014, 2015, 2016)), applying this general scheme to toy models of a multiverse (in
particular, models about the proportions of various species of dark matter). The over-
all effect will be to show that there can be a severe problem of under-determination
of theory by data.
Kachru et al. 2003; Susskind 2003; Freivogel et al. 2006).
21Direct experimental evidence for the other universes could perhaps be obtained from bubble
collisions, i.e. from the observational imprints they might leave in our domain (see Aguirre and
Johnson (2011) for a review). But such imprints have not yet been found (Feeney et al. 2011).
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5.2 A proposed scheme
In this Section, we will adopt a scheme that combines two proposals due to others:
(i) a proposal distinguishing three different problems one faces in extracting from
a multiverse theory, definite predictions about what we should expect to observe:
namely, the measure problem, the conditionalization problem, and the typicality prob-
lem (Aguirre and Tegmark (2005) and Aguirre (2007b)); (Section 5.2.1);
(ii) a proposal due to Srednicki and Hartle (2007, 2010) to consider the confirma-
tion of a multiverse theory in Bayesian terms (Section 5.2.2).
5.2.1 Distinguishing three problems: measure, conditionalization, and
typicality
Our over-arching question is: given some theory of the multiverse, how should we
extract predictions about what we should expect to observe in our domain? Aguirre
puts the question well:
Imagine that we have a candidate physical theory and set of cosmological
boundary conditions (hereafter denoted T ) that predicts an ensemble of
physically realized systems, each of which is approximately homogeneous
in some coordinates and can be characterized by a set of parameters (i.e.
the constants appearing in the standard models of particle physics and
cosmology; I assume here that the laws of physics themselves retain the
same form). Let us denote each such system a “universe” and the ensemble
a “multiverse”. Given that we can observe only one of these universes,
what conclusions can we draw regarding the correctness of T , and how?
(Aguirre, 2007b: 368–369)
Thus we want to somehow define the probability, assuming T , of a given value, ~p
say, of a set of observables. But calculational complexities and selection effects make
this difficult. Aguirre goes on to propose a helpful ‘divide and rule’ strategy, which
systematizes the various considerations one has to face. In effect, there are three
problems, which we now describe.22
5.2.1.A: The measure problem: To define a probability distribution P , we first
need to specify the sample space: the type of object M that are its elements—
traditionally called ‘outcomes’, with sets of them being called ‘events’. Each ob-
servable will then be a random variable on the sample space, so that for a set of
observables ~p, P (~p) is well-defined. One might take each M to be a domain in the
sense above, so that P (~p) represents the probability of ~p occurring in a randomly
22Features of these problems are implemented in actual calculations by, for example, Tegmark
(2005) and Aguirre and Tegmark (2005). But a comprehensive treatment, with each of the three
components explored in detail, has yet to be carried out.
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chosen domain: where P may, or may not, be uniform on the sample space.23 But
it is not clear a priori that domains should be taken as the outcomes, i.e. the basic
alternatives. For suppose, for example, that T says domains in which our observed
values occur are much smaller than domains where they do not occur. So if we were
to split each of these latter domains into domains with the size of our domain, the
probabilities would radically change. In short, the problem is that there seems no a
priori best way of selecting the basic outcomes.
Besides, this problem is made worse by various infinities that arise in eternal infla-
tion. Mathematically natural measures over reasonable candidates for the outcomes
often take infinite values, and so probabilities often become ill-defined; (including
when they are taken as ratios of measures). Various regularization schemes have
been introduced to address such issues; but the probabilities obtained are not in-
dependent of the scheme used. This predicament—the need, for eternally inflating
space-times, to specify outcomes and measures, and to regularize the measures so as
to unambiguously define probabilities—is known as the measure problem. For a re-
view of recent efforts, cf. Freivogel (2011). (Note that this measure problem is not the
same as the problems besetting defining measures over initial states of a cosmological
model, as in (3) at the end of Section 1: cf. Carroll (2014: footnote 13).
5.2.1.B: The conditionalization problem: Even if one has a solution to the measure
problem, a second problem arises. It is expected, that for any reasonable T and any
reasonable solution to the measure problem, the probabilities for what we will see will
be small. For in eternal inflation, generically, much of the multiverse is likely to not
resemble our domain. Should we thus conclude that all models of eternal inflation are
disconfirmed? We might instead propose that we should restrict attention to domains
(or more generally: regions) of the multiverse, where we can exist. That is, we should
conditionalize: we should excise part of the sample space and renormalize the proba-
bility distribution, and then compare the resulting distribution with our observations.
This process of conditionalization can be performed in three main ways; (see Aguirre
and Tegmark 2005):
(i) we can perform no conditionalization at all—known as the “bottom-up” ap-
proach;
(ii) we can try to characterize our observational situation by selecting observ-
ables in our models that we believe are relevant to our existence (and hence for any
future observations and experiments that we may make)—known as the “anthropic
approach”;
(iii) we can try to fix the values of each of the observables in our models, except
for the observable we are aiming to predict the value of—known as the “top-down”
approach.
23One imagines that the domains are defined as subsets of a single eternally-inflating (classical)
space-time: cf. Vanchurin (2015).
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As one might expect, there are deep, unresolved issues, both technical and con-
ceptual, for both (ii) and (iii) above. For the anthropic approach, (ii), one faces the
difficult question of how precisely to characterize our observational situation, and
so which values of which observables we should conditionalize on. In the top-down
approach, (iii), it is unclear how we can perform this type of conditionalization in a
practical way.
And on both approaches, we expect the observable we aim to predict the value
of and the conditionalization scheme to be separated in an appropriate way—but it
is not clear how to go about doing this. It is natural to require that the observable
being predicted:
(a) is correlated with the conditionalization scheme (otherwise the conditionaliza-
tion scheme would play no role in the predictive framework), but:
(b) is not perfectly correlated with the conditionalization scheme (otherwise one
would be open to the charge of circularity).
So when it is not clear exactly how observables are correlated with the defining fea-
tures of a conditionalization scheme—as indeed it is not in eternal inflation!—the need
to strike a balance between these two requirements amounts to a difficult problem.
In short, the problem is: how can we distinguish the observable to be predicted, from
the defining features of the conditionalization scheme? (See Garriga and Vilenkin
(2008, Section III) who mention such concerns, and Hartle and Hertog (2013).)
5.2.1.C: The typicality problem: Even if one has solved (at least to one’s own
satisfaction!) both the measure and conditionalization problems, a third problem
remains: the typicality problem. Namely: for any appropriately conditionalized prob-
ability distribution, how typical should we expect our observational situation to be,
amongst the domains/regions, to which the renormalized probability distribution is
now restricted? In other words: how much “away from the peak, and under the tails”
can our observations be, without our taking them to disconfirm our model? In the
next Section, we will be more precise about what we mean by ‘typicality’; but for
now, the intuitive notion will suffice.
Current discussions follow one of two distinct approaches. One approach asserts
that we should always assume typicality with respect to an appropriately conditional-
ized distribution. This means we should assume Vilenkin’s “principle of mediocrity”,
or something akin to it (Gott (1993); Page (1996); Vilenkin (1995); Bostrom (2002);
Garriga and Vilenkin (2008)). The other approach asserts that the assumption of typ-
icality is just that—an assumption—and is thus subject to error. So one should allow
for a spectrum of possible assumptions about typicality; and in aiming to confirm a
model of eternal inflation, one tests the typicality assumption, in conjunction with the
measure and conditionalization scheme under investigation. This idea was developed
within a Bayesian context most clearly by Srednicki and Hartle (2007, 2010); and it
is to a discussion of their scheme that we now turn.
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5.2.2 The Srednicki-Hartle proposal: frameworks
Srednicki and Hartle (2010) argue that in what they call a “large universe” (i.e. a
multiverse), we test what they dub a framework : that is, a conjunction of four items:
a cosmological (multiverse) model T , a measure, a conditionalization scheme, and
an assumption about typicality. (Agreed, the model T might specify the measure;
but it can hardly be expected to specify the conditionalization scheme and typicality
assumption.)
If such a framework does not correctly predict our observations, we have license
to change any one of its conjuncts,24 and to then compare the distribution derived
from the new framework with our observations. One could, in principle, compare
frameworks by comparing probabilities for our observations against one another (i.e.,
by comparing likelihoods); or one can formulate the issue of framework confirmation
in a Bayesian setting (as Srednicki and Hartle do).
To be more precise, let us assume that a multiverse model T includes a prescription
for computing a measure, i.e. includes a proposed solution to the measure problem:
this will simplify the notation. So given such a model T , a conditionalization scheme
C, and a typicality assumption, which for the moment we will refer to abstractly as
ξ: we aim to compute a probability distribution for the value D0 of some observable.
We write this as P (D0|T , C, ξ). Bayesian confirmation of frameworks then proceeds
by comparing posterior distributions P (T , C, ξ|D0), where
P (T , C, ξ|D0) =
P (D0|T , C, ξ)P (T , C, ξ)
∑
{T ′,C′,ξ′} P (D0|T ′, C′, ξ′)P (T ′, C′, ξ′)
, (5.1)
and P (T , C, ξ) is a prior over the framework {T , C, ξ}.
How then do we implement typicality assumptions? Srednicki and Hartle (2010)
develop a method for doing so by assuming there are a finite number N of locations
where our observational situation obtains. Assumptions about typicality are made
through “xerographic distributions” ξ, which are probability distributions encoding
our beliefs about at which of these N locations we exist. So if there are space-time
locations xA, with A = 1, 2, . . . , N , where our observational situation obtains, the
xerographic distribution ξ is a set of N numbers ξ ≡ {ξA}
N
A=1, such that
∑N
A=1 ξA = 1.
Thus typicality is naturally thought of as the uniform distribution, i.e., ξA = 1/N .
Assumptions about various forms of atypicality correspond to deviations from the
uniform distribution. Likelihoods P (D0|T , C, ξ) in Eq. (5.1) can then be computed
via: P (D0|T , C, ξ) =
∑N
A=1 ξAP (D0[A]|T , C), where D0[A] denotes that D0 occurs at
location A. (Admittedly, this equation is somewhat schematic: see Srednicki and
Hartle (2010: Appendix B) and Azhar (2015: Section II A and III) for more detailed
implementations).
In this way, different assumptions about typicality, expressed as different choices
of ξ, can be compared against one another for their predictive value. Azhar (2015)
24Philosophers of science will of course recognize this as an example of the Duhem-Quine thesis.
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undertakes the task of explicitly comparing different assumptions about typicality
in simplified multiverse cosmological settings. He shows that for a fixed model, the
assumption of typicality i.e. a uniform xerographic distribution (with respect to a
particular reference class) achieves the maximum likelihood for the data D0 consid-
ered. But typicality does not necessarily lead to the highest likelihoods for our data,
if one allows different models to compete against each other.
This conclusion is particularly interesting when for some model, the assumption
of typicality is not the most natural assumption. Hartle and Srednicki (2007: Section
II) make the point with an amusing parable. If we had a model according to which
there were vastly more sentient Jovians than Earthlings, we would surely be wrong,
ceteris paribus, to regard the natural corresponding framework as disconfirmed merely
by the fact that according to it, we are not typical observers. That is: it is perfectly
legitimate for a model to suggest a framework that describes us as untypical. And if
we are presented with such a model, we should not demand that we instead accept
another model under which typicality is a reasonable assumption. Indeed, demanding
this may lead us to choose a framework that is less well confirmed, in Bayesian terms.25
5.3 Different frameworks, same prediction
As an example of how the scheme described in Section 5.2.2 can lead to further
interesting insights, we describe recent work that investigates simplified frameworks
in toy models of a multiverse. The results will again illustrate the main theme of this
chapter: the under-determination of theory by data.26
Aguirre and Tegmark (2005) considered a multiverse scenario in which the to-
tal number of species of dark matter can vary from one domain to another. They
assumed the occurrence of the different species to be probabilistically independent
of one another; and then investigated how different conditionalization schemes can
change the prediction of the total number of dominant species (where two or more
species are called ‘dominant’ when they have comparable densities, each of which is
25Aficionados of the threat of “Boltzmann brains” in discussions of the cosmological aspects of
foundations of thermal physics will recognize the logic of the Jovian parable. We cannot here go
into details of the analogy, and the debates about Boltzmann brains; (cf. e.g. Albrecht and Sorbo
2004; De Simone et al. 2010). Suffice it to say that the main point is: a model that implies the
existence of many such brains may be implausible, or disconfirmed, or have many other defects;
but it is not to be rejected, just because it implies that we—happily embodied and enjoying normal
lives!—are not typical. In other words: it takes more work to rebut some story that there are zillions
of creatures who are very different from me in most respects, but nevertheless feel like me (“share my
observations/experiences”), than just the thought ‘if it were so, how come I am not one of them?’.
For the story might also contain a good account of how and why, though I feel like them, I am
otherwise so different.
26This section is based on Azhar (2014, 2016), which both build upon the work of Aguirre and
Tegmark (2005). The scheme we use does not explicitly address the measure problem; we simply
assume there is some solution, so that probability distributions over observables of interest can
indeed be specified.
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much greater than the other species’ density). Azhar (2016) extended this analysis,
by considering (i) probabilistically correlated species of dark matter, and (ii) how
this prediction varies when one makes various assumptions about our typicality, in
the context of various conditionalization schemes. We will thus conclude this Section
by outlining one example of this sort of analysis, and highlighting the conclusions
about under-determination thus obtained.
In the notation of Section 5.2.1; assume that T is some multiverse model (with
an associated measure), which predicts a total of N distinct species of dark mat-
ter. We assume that from this theory we can derive a joint probability distribution
P (η1, η2, . . . , ηN |T ) over the densities of different dark matter species, where the den-
sity for species i, denoted by ηi, is given in terms of a dimensionless dark matter-to-
baryon ratio ηi := Ωi/Ωb. We observe the total density of dark matter ηobs :=
∑N
i=1 ηi.
In fact, according to results recently released by the Planck collaboration, ηobs ≈ 5
(Ade et al. 2015).
In Azhar (2016), some simple probability distributions P (η1, η2, . . . , ηN |T ) are
postulated, from which considerations of conditionalization and typicality allow one
to extract predictions about the total number of dominant species of dark matter.
The conditionalization schemes studied in Azhar (2016) (and indeed in Aguirre and
Tegmark 2005) include examples of the “bottom-up”, “anthropic”, and “top-down”
categories discussed in Section 5.2.1.27 And considerations of typicality are imple-
mented in a straightforward way, by taking typical parameter values to be those that
correspond to the peak of the (appropriately conditionalized) probability distribu-
tion.28
Here is one example of the rudiments of this construction. Top-down condition-
alization corresponds to analyzing probability distributions P (η1, η2, . . . , ηN |T ) along
the constraint surface defined by our data, i.e., η :=
∑N
i=1 ηi ≈ 5. The number of
species of dark matter that contribute significantly to the total dark matter density,
under the assumption of typicality, is then the number of significant components that
lie under the peak of this distribution on the constraint surface.
Azhar (2016) shows that different frameworks can lead to precisely the same pre-
diction. In particular, the prediction that dark matter consists of a single dominant
component can be achieved through various (mutually exclusive) frameworks. Be-
27To be more precise: in the bottom-up and top-down cases, the total number N of species is fixed
by assumption, and one looks for the total number of dominant species; while in the anthropic case,
N is allowed to vary, and one looks for the total number N of equally contributing components.
28The issue of how this characterization of typicality relates to xerographic distributions is subtle.
It should be clear that for a finite number of domains, the assumption of typicality as encoded by a
uniform xerographic distribution corresponds to assuming that we (and thus the parameter values
we observe) are randomly ‘selected’ from among the domains, and this is typicality as understood in
the straightforward way. The corresponding relationship for the case of atypicality is more nuanced.
For with non-uniform xerographic distributions, one has the freedom to choose which of the domains
receive which precise (xerographic) weight: a feature that is lost when one assumes that atypicality
corresponds to an appropriate deviation from the peak of a probability distribution.
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sides, the case of multiple dominant components does not fare any better. In this
sense, any future observation that establishes the total number of dominant species
of dark matter will under-determine which framework could have given rise to the
observation.
The moral of this analysis is thus that if in more realistic cosmological settings,
this under-determination is robust to the choice of which observable we aim to predict
the value of (as one would expect), then we must accept that our observations will
simply not be able to confirm any single framework for the inflationary multiverse.
6 Envoi
So much by way of surveying how cosmology, especially primordial cosmology, bears
on scientific realism. Let us end by very briefly summarizing our position. We have
espoused scientific realism as a modest thesis of cognitive optimism: that we can know
about the unobservable, and that indeed we do know a lot about it. Cosmology causes
no special trouble for this thesis: though there are systematic limitations, even in the
form of theorems, about what we can know about the global structure of spacetime
(Section 2). Besides, this thesis is well illustrated, we submit, by countless results of
modern cosmology: astonishing though these results are, as regards the vast scales
of distance, time (or other quantities, such as temperature, energy and density) that
they involve (Section 3).
Of course, probing ever more extreme regimes of distance, time or these other
quantities tends to call for more inventive and diverse techniques, as regards theory
as well as instrumentation. So it is unsurprising that probing the very early universe
involves intractable cases of under-determination of theory by data. In the second
half of the paper, we saw this in inflationary cosmology: both for ascertaining the
details of the inflaton field, for example its potential (Section 4); and for the prob-
lems of confirming a multiverse theory (Section 5). But as we said in Section 1, we
do not see these cases of under-determination as threatening scientific realism. For
it claims only that we can know about the unobservable, and indeed do know a lot
about it—not that all the unobservable is knowable.
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